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STATE LAWS liMITING liABIliTY FOR NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES: HOW COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE
RELATED LEGAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES IN ASBESTOS
PERSONAL INJURY CASES

M. King Hill, mt
Katherine D. Williamstt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, "more than three-fifths of the states enacted some
form of tort reform legislation"l in response to a widely perceived
insurance crisis and criticism among legal scholars that the tort system had become ineffective. 2 Two of the most widely adopted methods of reform involved placing limits on noneconomic damages and
modifying joint and several liability.3
The statutory limits, or caps, on noneconomic damages have
varied widely among the states that have enacted them.4 Some states
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of Defense Counsel, 1988-98. M. King Hill, III., is a partner at Venable, Baeger
and Howard, LLP, where he is a member of Venable's Product Liability and
Personal Injury Practice Group.
B.A., University of Maryland, College Park, 1979; J.D., cum laude, University of
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Howard, LLP, where she is a member of Venable's Product Liability and Personal Injury, Commercial, and Appellate Practice Groups.
The authors often represent manufacturers in litigation involving asbestosrelated injuries.
Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of
Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 628, 628 (1988).
See id. These reforms included modifying joint and several liability, limiting
noneconomic damages, "re-establishing many sovereign immunities, limiting
liability for certain activities or actors," limiting the recovery of attorney's fees,
imposing penalties for frivolous lawsuits, and encouraging alternative dispute
resolution. Id. at 633-34.
See id. at 633.
See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Com-
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impose noneconomic damages caps in tort cases generally;5 other
states limit noneconomic damages, but only in medical malpractice
cases;6 and other states impose noneconomic damages caps for
other specific types of tort cases.? Several state statutes have been inpensation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1567, 1567-68 (1997) ("Twenty-three states currently
place statutory limitations on tort damages for pain and suffering: seven states
cap damages in general tort cases; an additional sixteen states limit awards
solely in medical malpractice cases. Several states also have provisions limiting
damages in other, very specific types of tort cases." (footnotes omitted».
5. See id. at 1567 & n.l (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(b) (Michie 1996)
($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages), COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21102.5(3) (West 1989) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages unless the
court finds justification through clear and convincing evidence, thereby increasing the limit to $500,000), HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (Michie 1995)
($375,000 limit on damages for pain and suffering with certain classes of torts
excepted), IDAHO CODE § 6-1603(1) (1990) ($400,000 cap on noneconomic
damages), 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West Supp. 1997)
($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages), MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 11-108 (1995) ($500,000 limit on nonpunitive noneconomic damages), and
OR REv. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1995) ($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages».
6. See id. at 1567-68 & n.2 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1997)
($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages), IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3(a)
(West Supp. 1996) ($750,000 limit on total damages), and RAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3407 (a) (1) (1994) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages), and comparing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1299.42(B)(1) (West 1992) ($500,000 limit on
total damages), MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1997)
($500,000 limit on total damages and $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages
with exceptions allowed for special circumstances), MICH. COMPo LAws ANN.
§ 600.1483 (West 1996) ($280,000 limit on noneconomic damages with exceptions), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210(1) (West 1988) ($350,000 cap on
noneconomic damages), NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (1993) ($1,250,000 limit
on total damages), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6(A) (Michie 1996) ($600,000 limit
on total damages except for punitive damages and medical expenses), N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-42'{)2 (1996) ($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages), S.c.
CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a) (3)-(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) ($1,000,000 limit on
damages in claims against doctors employed by any government entity), S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 21-3-11 (Michie 1987) ($500,000 cap on noneconomic damages), UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1996) ($250,000 limit on nonpunitive,
noneconomic damages), VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1992)
($1,000,000 cap on total damages), W. VA. CODE § 55-78-8 (1994) ($1,000,000
limit on noneconomic damages), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West
1997) ($350,000 cap on noneconomic damages».
7. See id. at 1603 & n.3 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-44-113 (West Supp.
1996) ($1,000,000 limit on total damages, $250,000 for noneconomic damages,
in claims against ski areas), GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6 (Supp. 1996) (no punitive
damages in claims solely for emotional distress), RAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903(a)
(Harrison 1994) ($100,000 limit on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death

1998]

Limiting liability for Damages

319

validated on state or federal constitutional grounds. 8 Despite constitutional issues, states continue to introduce legislation in an effort
to place limits on noneconomic damage awards. 9
Maryland's cap statute, section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, was enacted in
19~6 to respond to a perceived crisis in Maryland concerning the
cost and availability of liability insurance. 1O Section 11-108 estabsuits), MONT. CODE M'N. § 39-2-905(3) (1995) (no pain and suffering damages
in wrongful discharge cases), and NY INS. LAw § 5104 (McKinney 1985) (no
pain and suffering damages for negligent operation of an automobile if there
is no serious injury».
8. See id. at 1568 & n.4 (noting that in Alabama, Florida, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Texas, and Washington, statutory damage limitation provisions have been
struck down as unconstitutional). A statutory limitation on noneconomic damages was found to violate a plaintiff's right to due process where the court
found that the plaintiff had a vested property right in a particular measure of
damages and the statute as enacted denied recovery on an arbitrary basis. See,
e.g., Peter A. Davis, The Constitutionality of Michigan s Medical Malpractice Damages Cap: Can it Survive Judicial Review?, 75 MICH. BJ 258, 258-62 (1996) (discussing Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)
(holding that a medical malpractice noneconomic damage cap statute violated
the plaintiff's due process rights as guaranteed by Illinois' state constitution)
and Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting
plaintiff's due process challenge to California's medical malpractice damages
cap statute». A damage cap statute was found to violate a plaintiff's right to
equal protection of the laws because it classified the limits imposed on claims
in an unfair, arbitrary, and unreasonable manner. See id. at 262 (citing Carson
v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980». In addition, a statutory limitation on
noneconomic damages was found to violate a plaintiff's Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial to the extent that it required a judge to disregard the
amount of jury award which exceeded the limit set forth in the statute. See id.
(citing Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assoc., 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991».
9. See, e.g., 1997 N.Y A.B. 1930 (Personal Injury Action Noneconomic Damages)
(introduced); 1997 S.C. H.B. 3023 (Enactment of Noneconomic Damages
Awards Act 1997) (introduced).
10. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992); Report of
the Governors Task Force to Study Liability Insurance 3-4 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter
Governors Task Force Report]; Report ofJoint Executive/Legislative Task Force on Medical Malpractice Insurance 5 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Joint Task Force Report]; Diana M. Schobel, Recent Development, The Application of the Cap on Noneconomic
Damages to Wrongful Death Actions, 54 MD. L. REv. 914, 914 (1995) (citing
United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 549, 620 A.2d 905, 913 (1993». Statewide task forces formed to study the issue concluded that a noneconomic
damages cap would lead to greater predictability of damage awards, making
the insurance market more stable and thus more attractive to insurance underwriters. The Governors Task Force Report noted that noneconomic damages
are "impossible to ascertain with precision and are subject to emotional ap-
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lished a $350,000 limit on "any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986."11
Notwithstanding the statute's seemingly straightforward language,
difficult issues of interpretation have arisen concerning its applicability in product liability cases involving injuries arising out of latent
diseases, specifically asbestos cases. 12
The primary issue that Maryland courts have addressed, but
failed to resolve with any workable test, is how to determine when a
cause of action "arose" in determining whether the noneconomic
damages cap is applicable to a case involving an asbestos-related, latent diseaseY This is an issue in cases filed after July 1, 1986, the
noneconomic damages cap statute's effective date, where exposure

peals to a jury.» Governor's Task Force Report, supra at 11. It concluded that a
$250,000 cap would "help contain awards within realistic limits.» Id. at 10.
11. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1997). A 1994 amendment increased the cap to $500,000 for actions in which the cause of action arose on
or after October 1, 1994. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 34 n.6, 660 A.2d
423,428 n.6 (1995). The 1994 amendment also expanded the cap to apply in
wrongful death actions, in addition to personal injury actions. See Limitations
on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws 2292 (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (Supp. 1998».
12. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Six Maryland appellate cases have
addressed the issue of whether Maryland's noneconomic damages cap statute
applied to limit the plaintiff's noneconomic damage award. The court of appeals addressed the issue in one case, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md.
107, 124, 604 A.2d 47, 55 (1992) (holding that Maryland's noneconomic damages cap did not apply to limit the plaintiff's damage claim). The court of special appeals has addressed the issue of whether the noneconomic damages cap
applies to limit a plaintiff's noneconomic damages award in five cases: Porter
Hayden Co. v. Brannan, No. 190 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. Mar. 10, 1998) (unpublished
opinion), ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 1998 WL 2803, at *49-50 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.
Jan. 7, 1998), Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998),
Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), and
Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 591 A.2d 544 (1991), afj'd in part,
rev'd in part, 326 Md. 107,604 A.2d 47 (1992). Two other cases are awaiting decision by the court of special appeals: Owens Coming v. Bauman, No. 98-744
(Md. Ct. Sp. App. filed Nov. 11, 1997) (notice of appeal), and Owens Coming
v. Walatka, No. 98-385 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. filed Oct. 9, 1997) (notice of appeal).
Defendant Ford has petitioned for certiorari in Grewe v. Ford Motor Co., one of
the two consolidated cases decided by the court of special appeals in Ford Motor Co. v. Wood. The court of appeals has granted certiorari in Anchor Packing
Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5, cert. granted, 346 Md. 373, 697
A.2d 112 (1997), and Porter Hayden v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112
(1997). However, the court did not grant certiorari on the cap issue.
13. See infra notes 22-24, 35-116 and accompanying text.
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to the asbestos product occurred well in advance of that date. 14
The determination of when a cause of action arose ultimately
depends upon answering the question: When did the injury occur?15
Plaintiffs generally argue that the injury occurred on the date of
first exposure to the product. 16 Defendants maintain that no injury
occurs until the plaintiff actually becomes ill-when the plaintiff experiences symptoms of disease and incurs damages, such as medical
expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages. 17
The problem lies not only in determining when the injury occurred, but also in determining what the injury is. 18 In asbestos litigation, this question is particularly difficult to answer in mesothelioma cases,19 which involve an extremely long latency period
consisting of a complex progression of cellular changes between exposure to asbestos and the ultimate diagnosis of the disease. 2o Unfortunately, the decisions to date by Maryland appellate courts have
served only to complicate the issue. 21
Maryland courts have attempted to resolve the issue of when a
cause of action arises in an asbestos case by holding that the cause
of action arises when the injury-the disease-"comes into exis14. See infra notes 22-24, 35-116 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. This issue arises where a plaintiff

16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.

does not experience symptoms and is not diagnosed prior to the effective date
of the statute. The cap prevents plaintiffs from recovering more than $350,000
in noneconomic damages when the cause of action arose after July 1, 1986.
Consequently, plaintiffs seek to avoid the cap by contending that their injury
occurred when their cancer developed-at some time before the statute's effective date-notwithstanding that they may not have experienced any symptoms until after the effective date. Defendants maintain that the cap should
apply to limit a plaintiff's damages, arguing that a plaintiff cannot incur legally compensable damages prior to the development of any symptoms, which
occur in many cases after the cap's effective date, because of the long latency
period.
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79, 92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 70-79, 88-94 and accompanying text.
See Scott S. Shepardson, Note, Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.: A
Cruel Accrual Rule?, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 459, 463 (1998) ("Mesothelioma is a particularly aggressive form of cancer that is remarkable in that it is caused almost exclusively by exposure to asbestos.").
See infra notes 95-96, 108-09 and accompanying text.
See Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47, 53-54 (1992)
(holding that a cause of action arises when the injury comes into existence). In
the context of a disease with a long latency period, this determination is difficult at best. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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tence."22 In the context of litigating a case involving a latent disease
such as mesothelioma, this test requires extensive expert testimony.23
Even with an expert opinion as to when a cancer began to develop,
there remains the question of when the plaintiff's injury came into
existence. Was it when the first cancerous cell formed, when a malignant tumor formed, or when the tumor developed to the extent
that the plaintiff experienced symptoms? Could a legally compensable injury occur prior to the plaintiff incurring damages such as
medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering? Could a legally
compensable i~ury occur before the plaintiff was even aware that
he was injured? Who has the burden of proof as to these issues?
When does an injury arise in the context of a loss of consortium
claim? These questions are awaiting ultimate resolution in Maryland
and will likely arise in other states which have enacted or may enact
similar noneconomic damages cap statutes. 24
The California Supreme Court recently adopted a test that
avoids the uncertainty inherent in the Maryland test and reduces
the need for complex medical testimony. The California test provides that a cause of action for damages from a latent disease accrues, for purposes of the cap statute, when the disease is diagnosed
or the plaintiff discovers the illness or injury, whichever occurs
first. 25 In adopting this test, the California Supreme Court rejected a
qualified "appreciable harm" test, similar to Maryland's "legally
compensable injury" test, declaring that the appreciable harm test
bore "little or no relation to the considerations of fairness and policy" which guided the California court in its interpretation of the
statute. 26 To date, no other state has addressed the specific issue of
22. Owens-Illinois, 326 Md. at 120-21, 604 A.2d at 53-54.
23. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
24. This issue may arise in latent disease cases in states enacting cap statutes
which limit noneconomic damages awards generally and contain no express
applicability provisions or which contain applicability provisions similar to Maryland's-one providing that the statute is applicable to causes of action "arising" or "accruing" after the statute's effective date. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT.
§ 09.17.010 (Michie 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1989); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1603 (1987); 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West 1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.54 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
At least one state has avoided this issue by providing that the cap statute is applicable to causes of action filed on or after its effective date. See, e.g., MICH.
CaMP. LAws § 600.2946a (1996).
25. See Buttram v. Owens-C;orning Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71,80 (Cal. 1997).
26. Id. at 83; if. Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y
1995). In Consorti, the Court of Appeals of New York considered" 'whether a
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when a cause of action arises for purposes of a noneconomic damages cap.27
Part II of this Article reviews the development of Maryland law
on the issue of when a cause of action arises and the closely related
issue of what constitutes an injury in the application of Maryland's
cause of action lies for loss of consortium where, prior to the marriage, the
plaintiff's spouse was exposed to, and ingested, a substance that remained in
his body and eventually caused illness, but the illness did not occur until after
the marriage.''' Id. at 1301 (quoting Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 45 F.3d 48,49 (2d Cir. 1995». In concluding that such a plaintiff would
not have a cause of action, the court rejected a "fact-based date of medical injury test" based on "practical and policy reasons . . . [including] the need to
provide manufacturers, employers and other economic actors who are potential defendants with a degree of certainty or predictability in assessing the risk
of liability and to avoid stale claims which often turn on questions of credibility or disputed medical judgments." Id. at 1302. The court reaffirmed a
"bright line, readily verifiable rule ... in which, as a matter of law, the tortious injury is deemed to have occurred upon the introduction of the toxic
substance into the body." Id. The court did not distinguish between the injury
to the person and the injury to the marital relationship. In a later case, the
Court of Appeals of New York recognized that its bright line "exposure" rule
was abrogated by statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R 214-c (McKinney 1986), which provides
for a discovery rule in toxic tort cases. See Blanco v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y 1997).
27. Several courts have addressed the question of when a claim arises or accrues
with regard to the applicability of statutes that established exclusive theories of
liability in product liability actions after their effective dates. See, e.g., Brown v.
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 526-30 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
under Louisiana law, for purposes of application of the Louisiana Product Liability Act, a smoker's cause of action accrued not upon exposure, but upon injury; affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant on pre-Act causes
of action because the plaintiff, who was diagnosed after the Act's effective
date, produced no evidence of injury prior to the effective date; holding doctor's affidavit that there can be a 10 year latency period between exposure and
development of cancer was insufficient to show the plaintiff suffered pre-Act
damages); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992) (holding
that a cause of action accrues when plaintiff may bring a lawsuit; construing
"events~ as meaning injury producing events-repeated or significant tortious
exposurer-when the statute provided that it applied only to claims arising from
events occurring after the effective date); see also Viereck v. Fibreboard Corp.,
915 P.2d 581, 584 (Wash. 1996) (holding that under the Washington Product
Liability Act, the plaintiff's cause of action arose when injury producing event!Yexposure-occurred); if. Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d
1100, 1107 (Conn. 1989) (holding that under Connecticut's general product
liability statute, a cause of action accrued when plaintiff suffered actionable
harm-when plaintiff (1) discovered or should have discovered he had been
injured and (2) that defendant's conduct caused such injury).
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noneconomic damages cap statute in asbestos cases. 28 Part III discusses the evidentiary problems that arise when courts attempt to
apply Maryland's legal test to these cases. 29 Part III emphasizes the
weakness of this test in that it requires courts to rely on expert testimony to determine when an injury occurs, where the medical research has not advanced sufficiently to provide a definitive scientific
test. 30 Part IV examines how courts assign the burden of proof in
cases where application of the statutory limitation on damages is at
issueY Part V addresses the effect of Maryland's noneconomic damages cap statute on loss of consortium claims. 32 Finally, Part VI discusses a recent California case that sets forth a test which avoids
many of the problems inherent in Maryland's approach. 33 In conclusion, this Article suggests that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
should grant certiorari to clarifY many of the issues raised in this Article, and advocates adopting a test similar to California's.34
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MARYLAND LAW

During the 1980s, the insurance industry reacted to increasing
losses by raising premiums and canceling or refusing to issue certain high-risk policies. 35 As a result, Maryland experienced an insurance crisis, evidenced by the unavailability of liability insurance for
certain businesses, particularly those engaged in hazardous activities,
and skyrocketing insurance premiums for doctors, particularly in
high-risk specialties. 36 In an effort to attract private insurers back to
Maryland, provide affordable liability insurance, and ensure an adequate supply of quality medical services in the state, the Maryland
General Assembly enacted section 11-108 of the Maryland Code,
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 37 Section 11-108 provides
that, in "any action for damages for personal injury in which the
cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an award for
noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000. "38
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra notes 35-116 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 11741 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 12441 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 177-214 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
See Manzer, supra note 1, at 629 & n.6.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368-69, 601 A.2d 102, 115 (1992).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1997).
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Notwithstanding the statute's seemingly straightforward language, its application to personal injury actions involving latent diseases has proven to be problematic. 39 Specifically, Maryland courts
have failed to develop a clear test for determining when a plaintiffs
cause of action arises to determine whether the cap should apply in
an asbestos-related latent disease case.40
A.

Armstrong I

In Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong (Armstrong 1) ,41 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland construed the meaning of the phrase
"cause of action arises" in section 11-108. Plaintiff Armstrong, a
shipyard worker, and three other workers brought product liability
claims in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against manufacturers, installers, and suppliers of asbestos-containing insulation, under
theories of negligence and strict liability.42 The jury awarded Armstrong $730,000 in compensatory damages: $5,000 for future medical expenses and $725,000 for noneconomic damages. 43 Defendants
appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to reduce
the noneconomic damages award pursuant to section 11-108. 44
Defendant Owens-lllinois45 argued that because Armstrong was first
diagnosed with asbestosis in September 1987 (based on a medical
examination from the previous May), more than a year after the
section 11-108's effective date, his damage award was subject to the
cap.46 The court of special appeals disagreed and affirmed the
verdict. 47
The court of special appeals stated that a " 'cause of action
arises' in negligence or strict liability when facts exist to support
each element" of the claim. 48 The court rejected Owens-Illinois's
contention that a cause of action does not arise until it is "discov39. See infra notes 41-116 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 41-116 and accompanying text.
41. 87 Md. App. 699, 591 A.2d 544 (1991) [hereinafter Armstrong 1], afi'd in part,
reu'd in part, 326 Md. 107,604 A.2d 47 (1992).
42. See id. at 705, 591 A.2d at 547.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 707, 591 A.2d at 547.
45. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 111,604 A.2d 47, 49 (1992)
(noting that the second defendant, Eagle-Picher Industries' appeal was stayed
because it filed a Title 11 bankruptcy petition, thereby leaving Owens-Illinois
as the sole defendant seeking review of the judgments).
46. See Armstrong 1, 87 Md. App. at. 724, 591 A.2d at 556.
47. See id.
48. [d. at 725, 591 A.2d at 556.
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ered" by the plaintiff,49 holding that the term arises in section 11108 (b) does not carry the same meaning as the term "accrues."50
The court noted that the discovery rule, which delays the running
of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or could reasonably have discovered the nature and cause of the injury, did not
alter the moment at which a cause of action was deemed to have
arisen. 51 Therefore, the court concluded that the cause of action
arose when the facts existed to support each element, but it did not
accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations until discovery.52
The Armstrong I court then reviewed the evidence and concluded that Armstrong must have contracted asbestosis prior to July
1, 1986. 53 The court noted that Armstrong was diagnosed as having
asbestosis in September 1987,54 and he was continuously exposed to
asbestos between 1942 and 1963. 55 Owens-Illinois's medical expert
testified that asbestosis has a latency period-the period from exposure to diagnosis-of fifteen to twenty years, but in circumstances of
heavy exposure, it could be shorter. 56 Armstrong's medical expert
put the latency period at twenty to thirty years, but stated that asbestosis is present from the time the first fibers enter the lungsY The
court concluded that even assuming the longest latency period of
thirty years (from 1942 until 1972), by July 1, 1986, the disease
would have had fourteen more years to develop than was required
under normal exposure. 58 The court concluded that "[ i] t [was] inconceivable that Armstrong's asbestosis came into existence between
July 1, 1986 and his medical examination in May, 1987," and held
that his damage award was not controlled by the cap. 59 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted defendant
Owens-Illinois's petition for certiorari and reviewed the court of special appeals's decision in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong (Armstrong
49. See id.
50. See id. at 726, 591 A.2d at 557.
51. See id. (discussing Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d
299, 305 (1978) (extending discovery rule to situations involving latent development of disease».
52. See id. at 726, 591 A.2d at 557.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 725, 591 A.2d at 556.
55. See id. at 727, 591 A.2d at 557.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 727, 591 A.2d at 557.
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II) .60

B.

Armstrong II

In Armstrong IL the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
court of special appeals's holding that the cap was not applicable to
plaintiff Armstrong's damages award. 61 The Armstrong II court affirmed the court of special appeals's conclusion that the cause of
action arose "when facts exist[ed] to support each element," and
noted that, "[i]n a negligence claim, the fact of injury would seemingly be the last element to come into existence. "62 The Armstrong II
court concluded, therefore, that the cap applied only if Armstrong's
" 'injury' came into existence on or after July 1, 1986."63
The Armstrong II court acknowledged that, "[ u] nfortunately,
identifying the time at which an asbestos-related injury came into
existence is usually not a simple task."64 The court concluded, however, that it need not decide exactly when Armstrong contracted asbestosis because it was "inconceivable that Armstrong's asbestosis
came into existence between July 1, 1986 and his medical examination in May 1987. "65 The court noted that, based on the expert testimony, "it was reasonable to assume that Armstrong's asbestosis took
approximately 20 years to develop. "66 Because Armstrong's exposure
began in the early 1940s, the court found the most reasonable conclusion was that his asbestosis developed at least by the mid-1960s. 67
The court observed that even if the initial damage to Armstrong occurred in 1963, the last year he worked in the shipyard, the disease
ordinarily would have developed by 1983, and under unusual circumstances even earlier. 68 Thus, the court found the "only reasonable conclusion, even viewed in the light most favorable to OwensIllinois," was that Armstrong contracted asbestosis prior to the effec"tive date of the cap statute. 69
60. 326 Md. 107, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) [hereinafter Armstrong II].
61. See id. at 124, 604 A.2d at 55.
62. Id. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54 ("The breach, duty, and causation elements naturally precede the fact of injury.").
63. Id. at 122, 604 A.2d at 54.
64.Id.
65. Id. at 123, 604 A.2d at 55.
66. Id. at 124, 604 A.2d at 55.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
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Legally Compensable Injury

The Armstrong I opinion included a discussion of what is a legally compensable injury.70 The court held that mere alteration of the
pleura-the thin membrane which lines the chest wall and diaphragm-caused by asbestos inhalation did not constitute a legally
compensable injury.71 The court noted evidence demonstrating that
pleural plaques and pleural thickening-the respective terms for localized and widespread scarring resulting from asbestos inhalationaltered the pleura, but did not cause any loss or detriment. 72
Owens-Illinois's experts testified that "pleural plaques and pleural
thickening did not affect the human body, did not shorten life expectancy, did not cause complications or problems, did not cause
pain, and could not be felt."73 Likewise, plaintiffs' experts testified
that the two conditions had "no health significance and did not
cause any pain, dysfunction, symptoms or problems. "74
In holding that the mere alteration of the pleura was not a legally compensable injury, the court noted that harm was one of the
necessary elements of a cause of action in both negligence and
strict liability.75 The court cited section 7 (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines harm as "the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from a cause. "76 The
court then quoted comment "b" to section 7: " '[h]arm' implies a
loss or detriment to a person, and not a mere change or alteration
in some physical person, object or thing . . . . In so far as [sic]
physical changes have a detrimental effect on a person, that person
70. See Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 734, 591 A2d 544, 560-61
(1991) (discussing Wright v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 80 Md. App. 606,
565 A2d 377 (1989) (holding a jury instruction that the medical condition of
pleural plaques was not a compensable injury did not invade the province of
the jury because the plaintiffs had offered no evidence of injuries suffered
solely as a result of pleural plaques». The Armstrong I court noted that the
Wright court rejected plaintiffs' argument that pleural scars were "nonconsen ted alterations" to their bodies and, thus, grounds for compensation. Id. at
735, 591 A2d at 561. The Armstrong I court similarly rejected plaintiffs' broad
definition of "bodily harm," adopting instead the Restatement (Second) of Torts's
definition of "harm" as requiring a "loss or detriment," and not a "mere
change or alteration" to a person. Id. at 734, 591 A2d at 561.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 733, 591 A2d at 560.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 734, 591 A2d at 561.
76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (1965».
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suffers harm."77
Mter Armstrong I and II were decided, litigants cited both cases
as authority for diametrically opposing propositions. Plaintiffs
claimed that both cases supported the conclusion that a cause of action for damages resulting from an asbestos-related disease arises
upon exposure to the defendant's product, because the injury begins upon first inhalation.18 Defendants asserted that the Armstrong I
and II cases made clear that a cause of action cannot arise until the
plaintiff experiences some compensable harm that cannot occur until the disease has resulted in "functional impairment," which can
take place many years after exposure. 79
D.

Grimshaw

In April 1997, the court of special appeals again addressed the
applicability of the noneconomic damages cap in Anchor Packing Co.
v. Grimshaw,80 in which plaintiffs diagnosed with mesothelioma sued
manufacturers of asbestos products. 81 Defendants appealed from the
trial court's ruling that the noneconomic damages cap did not apply to the claims. 82 The court's ruling was based on expert testimony
that the mesothelioma occurred prior to July 1, 1986, the effective
date of the noneconomic damages cap statute. 83 All four plaintiffs
were diagnosed with mesothelioma; three in 1994 and one in 1993. 84
In Grimshaw, the court of special appeals concluded that it was
clear from the court of appeals's opinion in Armstrong II that a
cause of action for an asbestos-related disease arises before diagnosis. 85 However, the Grimshaw court observed that because of the particular facts in Armstrong II, the court of appeals did not have to de77. [d. (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. b (1965}).
78. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 159, 692 A.2d 5, 10
(1997), cert. granted sub. nom., Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373,
697 A.2d 112 (1997); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Porter Hayden Co.
v. Bullinger at 22 (1997) (No. 97-160).
80. 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), cert. granted sub. nom., Porter Hayden
Co. v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997).
81. See id. at 144, 692 A.2d at 10; see also Maryland Appeals Court Applies Statutory
Cap to Asbestos Cases, Anchor Packing v. Grimshaw, DES LmG. REp. (Andrews)
25710 (May 1997) (summarizing Grimshaw).
82. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 149, 692 A.2d at 13.
83. See id. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20.
84. See id. at 14748, 692 A.2d at 12.
85. See id. at 156, 692 A.2d at 16.
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termine precisely when the injury came into existence. 86 Thus, the
Grimshaw court proceeded to address the more exacting task of determining the precise date of injury.
Plaintiffs contended that an injury "arises in an asbestos-related
disease claim when an individual is first exposed to asbestos fibers
causing cellular changes to begin."87 However, the court of special
appeals reiterated its holding in Armstrong I, that to have a cause of
action based on product liability or negligence, the plaintiff must
produce evidence of a legally compensable injury.88 'The court also
restated the requirement of harm, citing section 7 (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,89 which provides in comment "b" that
" '[h]arm' implies a loss or detriment to a person, and not a mere
change or alteration in some physical person, object or thing."90
The Grimshaw court concluded that" [m]ere exposure to asbestos
and cellular changes resulting from asbestos exposure, such as pleural plaques and thickening, alone is not a functional impairment or
harm, and therefore, do not constitute a legally compensable injury."91 But, the Grimshaw court also rejected defendants' assertion
that the injury or harm does not arise until the symptoms of the
disease become apparent, dismissing the argument that such an approach would be less speculative. 92
The court concluded that an asbestos-related injury occurs
"when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes a legally compensable
harm. "93 Specifically, the Grimshaw court stated: "Harm results when
the cellular changes develop into an injury or disease, such as asbes-

86. See id. The Armstrong II court determined, based on expert testimony and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the defendant, that the plaintiffs' disease must have developed at least three years before the enactment of the
statute. See id.; see also supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
87. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 156, 692 A.2d at 16.
88. See id. at 158, 692 A.2d at 17.
89. See id.
90. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) cmt. b (1965».
91. Id. at 159, 692 A.2d at 17. In a footnote, the Grimshaw court added: "[T]his is
not to say that immediate harm cannot arise shortly after exposure to asbestos
fibers .... '[T]he inhalation and retention of asbestos fibers may cause immediate harm to the cells and tissues of the lung.' » Id. at 159 n.5, 692 A.2d at 17
n.5 (quoting Armstrong II, 326 Md. 107, 123, 604 A.2d 47, 55 (1992) (quoting
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 324 Md. 44, 61, 595 A.2d 469, 477
(1991») .
92. See id. at 160, 692 A.2d at 18.
93. Id.
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tosis or cancer. "94
The court then reviewed the expert testimony.95 At trial, two experts testified that mesothelioma typically exists ten years before diagnosis. 96 One expert testified that cancer began, at the earliest,
three years before diagnosis. 97 The court remarked that
"[u]nfortunately we are without the benefit of the trial court's reasoning in denying appellants' motion to apply the statutory cap to
noneconomic damages. "98 The court concluded, therefore, that it
had to assume that the trial court denied the defendants' motion to
apply the cap based on the expert testimony that the mesothelioma

94. Id.
95. See id. at 164, 692 A.2d. at 20. The court observed:
The expert witnesses testified that, generally, mesothelioma begins to grow ten years prior to diagnosis. The time between development of cancer and diagnosis, however, could be anywhere from five
to ten years. One expert testified that the cancer began, at the earliest, three years prior to diagnosis. At trial, an expert witness for the
plaintiffs, Dr. Mark, a pathologist, testified . . . that every exposure
that occurs prior to the tumor becoming malignant contributes to
the development of the tumor. Dr. Mark further stated that typically
the interval between the tumor starting and the diagnosis of
mesothelioma is between six months and three years.
Dr.' Gabrielson testified on direct that "probably sometime
around ten years before that cancer was recognized by the doctors,
there was a tiny little cancer growing." Dr. Gabrielson also stated that
the latency period for mesothelioma, the time from initial exposure
to the time of diagnosis of the disease, ranges anywhere from eighteen to fifty years. Later, on cross-examination, defendants' attorney
asked Dr. Gabrielson about his testimony concerning the latency p~
riod prior to the diagnosis of mesothelioma. Dr. Gabrielson stated
that "the time that [sic] cell has produced a clinically recognized tumor is on the order of five to ten years, probably more likely ten
years ... I don't think there is any absolute measure of that.
Similarly, Dr. Roggli testified that "it takes on average approximately 10 years for the tumor to become diagnosable clinically from
the time it starts growing its individual cancer cell." Dr. Roggli further explained that sarcomatoid tumors, which Grimshaw had, grew
at a faster rate than biphasic variants of a mesothelioma, and begin
growing sometime within five years prior to diagnosis. He further
stated that epithelial cell-type mesothelioma ... begin to grow sometime within ten years prior to diagnosis.
Id.
96. See supra note 95.
97. See supra note 95.
98. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20.
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developed before July 1, 1986.99 The court of special appeals noted
that, although there was some medical testimony to the contrary, "it
was up to the trial court, as the trier of fact on that issue, to weigh
the evidence and reach a final determination."loo
The Grimshaw court held, based on the expert testimony,101 that
the record supported a finding that plaintiffs developed cancer, and
that their causes of action arose, at least eight years prior to diagnosis in 1994 (three plaintiffs) and seven years prior to diagnosis in
1993 (one plaintiff), and thus their causes of action arose before
July 1, 1986, the statute's effective date. 102 Therefore, the court of
special appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 103
In Grimshaw, the court of special appeals, while purporting to
set forth a clear test for determining when an asbestos-related injury
occurs, merely confused the issue, as is illustrated by its holding. I04
The Grimshaw court held "that an injury occurs in an asbestosrelated injury case when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes a
legally compensable harm. Harm results when the cellular changes
develop into an injury or disease, such as asbestosis or cancer."105
The first sentence appears to be clear: that an injury occurs
when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes legally compensable
harm. Legally compensable harm would seemingly be such harm
that would form a basis for recovery by a plaintiff, such as medical
expenses, pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium.
However, the second sentence arguably means that a person who
has developed a cancerous cell has sustained legally compensable
harm, notwithstanding the fact that he has sustained no functional
impairment or loss-no medical expenses, pain and suffering, or
lost wages. 106
99. See
100. Id.
101. See
102. See
103. See

id.

supra note 95.
Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20-21.
id. at 165, 692 A.2d at 21. Defendants filed petitions for certiorari and the
court of appeals granted certiorari on July 30, 1997, in Porter Hayden Co. v. Bul-

linger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997), but specifically declined to take certiorari on the noneconomic damages cap issue.
104. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 160, 692 A.2d at 18.
105. Id.

106. Apparently, the court of special appeals equates the development of the first
cancerous pleural cell with the development of mesothelioma. The court of
appeals, however, has stated that mesothelioma is "the occurrence of malignant tumors in the pleura." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343
Md. 500, 506 n.2, 682 A.2d 1143, 1146 n.2 (1996). Because it is an undisputed
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Under the Grimshaw test, a plaintiff would conceivably be
deemed to have suffered legally compensable harm at the time his
injury is so undeveloped as to be undiagnosable, and may never actually develop into a legally compensable harm.107 Thus, under the
Grimshaw analysis, a plaintiff who developed a cancerous cell in 1980
and remained symptom-free until he died accidentally in 1995
would have had a cause of action for asbestos-related injuries, even
though he had experienced no functional impairment or other
compensable damages. lOS
medical fact that not every cancerous cell ultimately becomes part of a tumor,
the position taken by the court of special appeals is not scientifically supported.
107. In order to state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered legally compensable injuries. See Faya v. Almaraz, 329
Md. 435, 448, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993) (recognizing a compensable injury for
fear of acquiring AIDS from a surgeon); see also Metro-North Commuter RR
v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,117 S. Ct. 2113, 2115,138 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1997) (interpreting "injury" compensable under FELA; an individual does not suffer a
compensable injury "unless, and until he manifests symptoms of a disease");
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985)
(" [S] ubc1inical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to
constitute the actual loss or damage ... required to sustain a cause of action
under generally applicable principles of tort law."); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos
Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Haw. 1990) ("Plaintiffs must show a compensable harm by adducing objective testimony of a functional impairment due
to asbestos exposure.") (emphasis in original).
108. In January 1998, the court of special appeals decided two asbestos cases, Ford
Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998) and ACandS, Inc. v.
Abate, 1998 WL 2803 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.Jan. 7,1998). In Ford, the plaintiff, who
died of mesothelioma, worked from 1948 to 1952 in a garage and was allegedly exposed to asbestos dust created by mechanics working in an adjacent
area on automotive parts containing asbestos. See Ford, 119 Md. App. at 10, 703
A.2d at 1319. The pl<iintiff's estate and survivors sued Ford, the manufacturer
of the asbestos-containing parts. See id. at 9, 703 A.2d at 1318. The plaintiff began experiencing symptoms in 1992 and was diagnosed with mesothelioma in
1993. See id. at 46, 703 A.2d at 1337. Ford urged the court to find that the
plaintiff's cause of action arose when he began experiencing symptoms. Ford
argued that the cap statute required the determination of an exact date the
cause of action arose, which could only be determined precisely by looking at
when the first symptom or diagnosis occurred. See id. Ford urged that Annstrong II was distinguishable because the medical evidence in that case indicated that the plaintiff developed asbestosis at least by the mid-60s, and because it was inconceivable that the asbestosis came into existence between the
cap's effective date in 1986 and the date of diagnosis in 1987. See id. at 4647,
703 A.2d at 1337. Ford argued that as the date of manifestation of the disease
approached the statute's effective date, it was more important to determine
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It is speculative for a court to determine that a cause of action
exists at the time the first cancer cell forms. Tumors develop as a
result of a complex progression of cellular changes and unpredictable growth; therefore, a determination at the time of formation of
the first cancer cell as to the existence of a cause of action would
be impossibly speculative. 109 Even with the benefit of hindsight, such
a determination is no less speculative. It is impossible to determine
when the injury, and, thus, the cause of action, first existed because
of the latent nature of the injury, and the fact that medical science
has not developed adequate methods of measuring its growth. llD
Based on the court's analysis in Grimshaw, however, all that may be
necessary to show that such injury or legally compensable harm existed
before the effective date of the cap statute is expert testimony
which seemingly does no more than conclude that the injury could
the exact date the injury occurred. See id. The court rejected Ford's argument
that the Grimshaw test was too speculative. See id. at 48-49, 703 A.2d at 1338.
The court noted that the plaintiff's medical expert had testified that "his cancer likely began to develop at least ten years prior to the date of diagnosis."
Id. As the plaintiff was diagnosed in 1993, the court concluded that such evidence was sufficient to support a finding that his injury occurred prior to the
effective date of the cap statute. See id. at 48, 703 A.2d at 1338. It concluded
that, "[ u] nder Grimshaw, we will uphold a trial court's determination of when
an injury arises as long as that determination is supported by legally sufficient
evidence." Id. Ford has petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. In contrast to Ford, in ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, the court of special appeals applied the cap statute to a case involving a plaintiff diagnosed in 1992
with pleural plaques and held that the plaintiff's cause of action could not
have arisen until 1990, when he first experienced functional impairment as a
result of that condition. See Abate, 1998 WL 2803, at *50. The plaintiff's exposure to asbestos began in 1950, and a medical expert testified that pleural disease normally occurred between ten and fifteen years after first exposure;
thus, it could have manifested itself as early as 1960. See id. However, because
the plaintiff experienced no functional impairment until 1990, the court concluded that his cause of action did not arise until that time. See id. Accordingly, the court held that the noneconomic damages cap was applicable. See
id. These two seemingly inconsistent opinions, decided just one day apart, fail
to clarify Maryland law in this area.
109. See, e.g., Official Trial Transcript, Brannan v. ACandS, Consolidated Case No.
9535270, Indiv. Case No. 92153501 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (expert testimony). Dr. Brody testified that bodily defense mechanisms can clear away injured cells before they grow into tumors. See id. at T.662-63. Dr. Gabrielson further testified that all cancers have "multiple mutation, multiple chromosomal
aberrations," and that such changes occur over many years. "[ 0] nly after
there is the right combination is the cell fully cancerous." Id. at T.2318.
110. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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have occurred prior to that date. III
The following expert testimony formed the basis, in part, for
the Grimshaw trial court's determination that the plaintiffs' i~uries
occurred prior to 1986:

Q. Doctor, you testified ... about 10 years between the
manifestation or diagnosis of mesothelioma and when it began to grow, do you remember that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And isn't it true that it is your opmIOn that most
likely the period of growth for mesothelioma tumor is on
the order of five years?
A. The time that one cell has all of the genetic
changes, all of the chromosomal changes until the time
that that cell has produced a clinically recognized tumor is
on the order of five to ten years, probably more like ten
years ....
Maybe the tumor didn't develop until seven or eight
years before the clinical recognition, maybe five years.
Q. I [have] got your deposition taken in this case . . . .
The question was put to you, "Do you have an opinion as
to how long Mr. Grimshaw had this tumor before it was
diagnosed?"
And your answer was, "It is my opinion that the tumor
existed in some form probably on the order of five years
prior to diagnosis."
Was that part of your answer? And then you can see
the rest of it.
A. Then I rambled on probably on the order of five
years perhaps longer, perhaps ten years. Nobody knows for
sure. 1I2
Predictably, in the wake of the Grimshaw case, the application
of the noneconomic damages cap statute has become a battle of the
experts, with determinations of applicability hinging on opinions like
111. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 165, 692 A.2d 5, 20-21
(1997); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text. The court of special appeals recently reaffirmed the Grimshaw test in Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md.
App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998). See supra note 108.
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Porter Hayden Company, Anchor Packing v.
Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), cert. granted, Porter Hayden v.
Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997), Court of Appeals of Maryland,
No. 56, September Term, 1997 (quoting testimony of Mr. Grimshaw's expert).
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the above, which at times appear to be based on no more than the
purest speculation. 113 However, evidence based on mere speculation
will not support a claim for damages. 114
Plaintiffs' experts have testified that the period of growth for a
mesothelioma tumor-between inception and diagnosis-is likely to
occur within ten years. 115 It would seem to follow that a diagnosis after 1996 would trigger application of the cap. Proponents of the
Grimshaw test would assert, therefore, that the problems discussed
herein will resolve in time. Recent testimony by a medical expert
testifying for a plaintiff, however, illustrates that this may not be the
case:

Q. And, Doctor, with respect to the diagnosis in January of '97, do you have an opinion as to when [the plaintiff's] me~othelioma developed? .. .
A. It's my understanding ... that he actually had chest
pain as early as 1993. The type of mesothelioma he had was
an epithelial type. I would say that it would be probably
somewhere between 1980 and 1985 . . . .
Q. Now I think you've testified in the past at least epithelial mesotheliomas will develop within 10 years from the
date of diagnosis? . . .
A. I think what I've said is that they have started, at the
latest, ten years before they are diagnosed clinically. . ..
Q .... [H] ave you ever testified before, with respect to
a time period of development, that that goes from the time
of symptoms?
A. I've never specifically, I don't think, said that, but if
you look at how mesotheliomas are diagnosed and you look
at various patients ... when they're evaluated, is that there
are many cases where the mesothelioma is probably diagnosed sometimes as much as one to five years after the patient has developed a tumor. 116
Thus, the question becomes: how far will experts go (and be allowed to go) with their testimony in latent disease personal injury
113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 61-62, 344 A.2d 422, 427-28 (1975).
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
In re Baltimore City Asbestos Litig., March 1998 Trial Cluster, Lead Case: Hinsen v. ACandS, Inc., No. 86CG1151/23/181 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (deposition of Samuel Hammar, M.D., February 20, 1998).
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cases to avoid or to trigger the application of noneconomic
damages cap statutes?

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASE: THE FRYE-REED
AND DAUBERT STANDARDS
Under the Frye-Reed standard, which governs admissibility of scientific evidence in Maryland, the evidence at issue must be shown
to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular
scientific field.1I7 If a scientific technique's validity is in controversy
in the relevant scientific field, or if it is regarded generally as an experimental technique, expert testimony dependent upon its validity
cannot be admitted into evidence. liS
It is undisputed that medical science has not yet advanced so as
to enable doctors to determine the growth rate of a mesothelioma
tumor. 1I9 Thus, there is no definitive test to determine when a
117. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978). The Frye-Reed
standard is a stricter ,standard than that applied by federal courts, as articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert,
the Supreme Court concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded
the Frye test, reasoning that the "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement [for
admission of scientific evidence] would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of
the Federal Rules" of Evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 159 (1988) (citing Rules 701 to 705». The current inquiry under Rule 702 is whether the evidence in question is scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, i.e., whether the evidence is both
"reliable"-qualifies as scientific knowledge-and "relevant"-will assist the
trier of fact. See id. at 589-92. Despite the fa~t that the current Maryland rules
are derived from the federal rules, Maryland courts have chosen not to adopt
the relaxed Daubert standard. See Keene Corp. v. Hall, 96 Md. App. 644, 626
A.2d 997, cert. granted, 332 Md. 741 (1993); see also K. M. Carroll, Codifying the
Rul£ on Expert Testimony: Why Traditional A nalysis Should be Generally Acceptabl£,
54 MD. L. REv. 1085 (1995); JOSEPH F. MuRPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1406A (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has not explicitly decided whether the newly adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence modify the Frye-Reed standard. See id. at 89 (Supp. 1998). On several occasions, however, the court of appeals applied the Frye-Reed standard in cases
decided after the new rules became effective. See id.
118. See Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, 154, 664 A.2d 60, 64 (1995). See generally
3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 353
(2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998) (comparing the "validity standard" adopted by
the Court in Daubert with the Frye-Reed standard).
119. See Marc J. Straus, The Growth Characteristics of Lung Cancer and Its Application to
Treatment Design, 1 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 167 (1974).
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mesothelioma tumor began to form.120 Yet, as illustrated below, such
evidence is routinely admitted when courts are determining whether
the noneconomic damages cap applies.
In Sheppard v. ACandS, Inc.,121 an asbestos case tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in May 1997, the plaintiffs' expert testified as follows on direct examination:

Q. Doctor, with respect to the cancers caused by asbestos exposure, do you have an opinion within reasonable
medical certainty as to when those tumors began?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. With respect to mesothelioma, I think there is good
evidence in the medical literature to suggest that those cancers begin at least ten years before they are diagnosed clinically. . . .
Q. Now, you said there is some good evidence in the
literature.
Does this have to do with the idea of doubling times?
A. It does.
[Extended explanation of various studies involving
doubling times-mathematical formulas for measuring the
rate of growth of certain cancers]
Q. Doctor, the concepts about doubling time and how
cancers grow that you have discussed with the jury here today, are those concepts that are generally accepted in the
medical literature?
A. Yes. 122
The following testimony was elicited on cross-examination.

Q. Now, you told us that you had ... a pretty thick file
of articles that dealt with doubling, tumor doubling or tumor growth?
A. Yes.
Q. If I did pick up your file, there would only be one
article in that file that would deal specifically with the issue
120. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
121. No. 97121701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City).
122. Official Trial Transcript at T.161O, T.1660-61, Sheppard v. ACandS, Inc., No.
9712701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (testimony of Dr. Hammar). See the Appendix to this Article for an extended excerpt.
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of doubling or growth, tumor growth for mesotheliomas,
am I correct?
A. Only one that I know about. . . .
Q. You yourself have expressed that opmlOn under
oath that this very article, the only article dealing with
doubling time for mesotheliomas, in fact, in your opinion is
not reliable?
A. Well, I - I don't know exactly how I said it. I would
say that when you only have one article that talks about a
subject like that, you can't absolutely be certain that that is
what is going to come out to be the absolute way the data
IS . • • •

Q. For that reason, you do not think there is any absolute experimental data, either clinical or experimental for
that matter, that will tell us exactly what the doubling time
is for mesothelioma?
A. Correct. I think I answered that, too. . ..
Q. Now, at the close of your direct examination, Doctor, you were asked a question about when a specific - a
mesothelioma began in a specific individual. . . .
Q. Let me take you back to your deposition in the
Walatka matter . . . .
Quote, "QUESTION: SO, Doctor, if I were to put the
question to you, do you have an opinion to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty concerning how long before
June of 1995, Mr. Walatka had a malignant mesothelioma,
would you be able to answer that question?
"ANSWER: I wouldn't be able to answer in a scientific
manner, or a manner based on scientific fact. All I could
basically do would be to tell you what I just told you." . . .
"QUESTION: SO to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, you could not answer that question?
"ANSWER: That is probably correct. I really couldn't. I
don't think anybody can answer that question."123
As the above testimony illustrates, an adequate test has not
been developed to measure the growth rate of a mesothelioma tumor.124 Nonetheless, as the above excerpts illustrate, the dearth of
123. See id. at T.161O. See the Appendix to this Article for an extended excerpt.
124. Published studies on doubling time have measured cancers other than
mesothelioma. Doubling time differs dramatically depending on the cell type
of the tumor. See Strauss, supra note 119, at 169. Even within the same cell
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scholarship and the lack of an adequate formula has not stopped
plaintiffs' experts from opining as to the inception of the disease in
the various plaintiffs, and from basing their conclusions about the
date of inception of mesothelioma upon the doubling test. 125 Based
upon the above testimony, not only does the doubling method test
fail to meet Maryland's standard that the test be generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community, but it does not even meet
the more relaxed standard adopted by the Supreme Court in
Daubert. 126
Under Daubert, the evidence in question must be reliable and
relevant. 127 In order to be reliable, the evidence must qualify as "scientific knowledge." 128 The Court, in Daubert, defined scientific as
having a "grounding in the methods and procedures of science,"129
and knowledge as "more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation."13o Guidelines for determining whether evidence qualifies as scientific knowledge include: whether the theory or technique can or has been tested; whether it has been subject to peer
review and publication; the known or potential rate of error; standards for controlling the technique's operation; and general acceptance within the scientific community. 131
Based on the above testimony, it is clear that the doubling
method does not meet the reliability prong of the Daubert test when
applied to mesothelioma cases. Plaintiffs' experts acknowledge that
the scholarship on the test's application to mesothelioma is extremely limited, and its reliability has been questioned generally in
the medical community.132 Its application to mesothelioma cases is
admittedly uncertain and unsupported by any reliable data. 133 Accordingly, it does not meet the requirement of reliability as set
forth in Daubert.
type, the range of doubling time is broad. See id. at 168-69.
125. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
127. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); see also 4
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,

§ 702.05 Uoseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 1998) (discussing Daubert).
128. Daubert, 509 u.s. at 589-90 (citing FED. R EVID. 702 and explaining that the
rule applies to technical or specialized knowledge as well).
129. Id. at 590.
130. Id.
13l. See id. at 593-94; see also WEINSfEIN & BERGER, supra note 127, § 702.05 (discussing the four Daubert guidelines).
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the doubling method fails to meet the second
prong of the Daubert test because it is not relevant. A conclusion
based on application of the doubling method cannot assist the trier
of fact in determining the inception of a mesothelioma tumor because it is not based on scientific knowledge with regard to measuring mesothelioma tumor growth. 134 Moreover, the development of a
test which might meet the reliability and relevancy requirements
does not appear to be imminent. 135
Under the Armstrong and Grimshaw tests, much of the evidence
on when the inhalation of asbestos causes a legally compensable
harm involves speculative and medically unsupported expert testimony.136 In both Armstrong and Grimshaw, the courts were called
upon merely to decide whether the medical evidence was sufficient
to conclude that the injury occurred prior to the effective date of
the noneconomic damages cap statute. It is inevitable, however, that
the Maryland appellate courts will ultimately have to address the issue of admissibility of this expert testimony in future cases when the
trier of fact is called upon to determine when an asbestos-related
disease first occurred. The cap applicability test established by the
Maryland courts in Armstrong and Grimshaw, at least in its application to mesothelioma cases, relies upon the establishment of facts
which arguably cannot currently be supported scientifically in a
manner which meets the admissibility requirements of Maryland
law.I37
In rejecting plaintiffs' claims that an asbestos-related injury occurs, for purposes of the cap statute, upon exposure to asbestos,
and defendants' assertions that the injury occurs when the plaintiff
experiences symptoms of the disease, the Grimshaw court established
a functional impairment test for which there seems to be no objective
measure.138 By requiring a finding as to the onset of a disease,
134. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Official Trial Transcript at T.161O, T.1660-61, Sheppard v. ACandS,

Inc., No. 9712701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (testimony of Dr. Hammar); see also
supra notes 113-43 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
138. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 158-60, 692 A.2d 5, 1718 (1997). The lengthy latency period renders efforts to pinpoint the date on
which the disease was contracted virtually impossible, medically and legally. See
Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs, of course, would still argue that the development of the disease and the
commencement of a plaintiff's functional impairment occurs upon first exposure. Defendants would still maintain that such impairment cannot conceiva-
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which experts have testified occurs years before the first symptom,
the test requires a factual determination ~s to the first manifestation
of undetectable, asymptomatic, subclinical, cellular change. 139 There
appears to be no scientific test, nor does one appear to be imminently available, to make such a determination. 14o Thus, as long as
Grimshaw remains the law in Maryland with regard to determining
the applicability of the cap statute, evidentiary issues and problems
of proof will persist. Moreover, .other states using a test similar to
the Maryland test will face the same evidentiary issues, whether they
apply a Frey-Reed or Daubert standard of admissibility.141

IV.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Predictably, the evidentiary problems associated with the cap
applicability issue have wrought a threshold issue: Who bears the
burden of proof as to the applicability of the cap statute?142 Does
the defendant bear the burden of showing that the relevant injury
occurred after the effective date of the cap statute, or is it the plaintiff's burden to show that the injury occurred prior to that date?
Generally, plaintiffs claim that a defendant bears the burden of
proof on the applicability of the cap statute for the following
reasons. 143
1. When a defendant seeks to take advantage of a rule
requiring a reduction in the amount of damages claimed by
a plaintiff, the defendant has the burden of proving that
rule's applicability.l44
2. Plaintiffs asserting negligence and strict liability theories of recovery need only show that they suffered harm as
a result of the defendant's conduct. A defendant's reliance
on the cap statute to limit plaintiff's damages constitutes a
defense, avoidance or limitation on recovery, that must be
affirmatively proven by defendants. 145
bly occur until the onset of the first symptom.
139. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 161, 692 A.2d at 18; see also supra notes 122-23
and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., In re Baltimore City Personal Asbestos Litig., No. 97027701, slip op. at
5 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Sept. 9, 1997).
144. See id.
145. See id.
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3. Defendants seek to apply the cap statute in derogation of plaintiffs' common law right to obtain damages
deemed appropriate by the trier of fact; thus they must
prove its applicability.
Defendants, on the other hand, assert that plaintiffs bear the
burden of proof for the following reasons: 146
.

1. Assigning the burden of proof to a defendant would
create a presumption that the statute does not apply, and a
presumption against applicability is contrary to the remedial
purpose of the statute. The mandatory language of the statute establishes a presumption of its applicability.147
2. Where suit is filed and the evidence of first compensable harm occurs after July 1, 1986, the statute presumptively applies, and the person claiming inapplicability bears
the burden of proving avoidance of the statute. 148
3. The legislature did not make the cap an affirmative
defense.
4. Maryland asbestos cases l49 that have applied the cap
have all implicitly placed the burden on the plaintiff. 150
146. See id.; see also Reply Briefs of Appellants Owens Corning and Porter Hayden
Co., at 1-7 ACandS, Inc. v. Brannan, (97-190) (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 10,
1998).
147. See In re Baltimore City Personal Asbestos Litig., No. 97027701, slip op. at 5
(Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Sept. 9, 1997).
148. See id.
149. See supra note 12.
150. See Brown v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995); Chustz v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 961 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. La. 1996) (affirming and
granting, respectively, summary judgment motions of defendants based on
plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence that their causes of action accruedthat they suffered damages or bodily injury-before the effective date of the
Louisiana Product Liability Act).
Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Richard Rombro recently held, that
defendants bear the burden of proof as to applicability of the cap statute. See
Mem. Op. and Order, Walatka v. ACandS, Inc., No. 9234501, (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Sept. 9, 1997). The court maintained that the burden of proof is
on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue, and that burden never
shifts. See id. at 6. The court further maintained. that a defendant has the burden of proving matters of reduction and mitigation of plaintiff's damages, and
since the defendants sought the cap's benefit in order to reduce the verdict,
they bore the burden of proving its applicability. See id. The court found that
because the defendants presented no evidence that the plaintiff's functional
impairment developed after July 1, 1986, they failed to carry their burden of
proof as to the cap's applicability. See id. at 8.
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In Porter Hayden Co. v. Brannan, 151 the first Maryland appellate
opinion to expressly address the burden of proof issue in the context of applying the noneconomic damages cap, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that defendants bear the burden of
proof. 152 The court observed that" [t] he matter was simply of no significance until after the jury returned its verdict," and, thus, it rejected the defendants' contentions that the plaintiffs had the burden of producing evidence during trial to establish that the cap was
inapplicable. 153 The Brannan court noted that when the verdicts
were rendered, the defendants moved to reduce the amounts of the
awards in conformance with the statute. 154 The court observed that
" [0] rdinarily, the moving party bears the burden of establishing
that his or her motion should be granted," and concluded that it
could "perceive no reason to depart from the general rule in the
instant case."155 The court held that "none of the evidence ... established precisely when the plaintiffs developed their mesotheliomas,"156 and, therefore, the defendants failed to shoulder their
burden. 157
The court's ruling highlights a practical problem with assigning
the burden of proof to a defendant. Assigning the burden to a
defendant places the defendant in the position of denying that the
plaintiff has developed the disease and then having to offer expert
proof that the plaintiff developed the disease between 1986 and the
time of trial. Traditionally, defendants have been required to plead
in the alternative. For example, with regard to the defense of contributory negligence, a defendant maintains that it was not negligent, but assuming it was, plaintiff was also negligent in such a way
as to contribute to the accident. 158 Here, however, the defendant is
forced to present scientific evidence that directly contradicts its assertion as to plaintiff's lack of injury. It is fundamentally distinct
from a traditional plea in the alternative because in the traditional
scenario, the defendant is not forced to prove an element of the
plaintiff's case in order to prevail on the issue. As a practical matter,

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

No. 190 slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Mar. 10, 1998).
See id.
Id: at 40.
See id. at 40-41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
See id.
See, e.g., Azar v. Adams, 117 Md. App. 426, 700 A.2d 821 (1997).
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therefore, it may be unfair to assign this burden to a defendant. 159
This ruling adds to the uncertainty and highlights the unworkability of the current test for determining whether to apply the
noneconomic damages cap. While the Maryland appellate courts
have acknowledged the difficulty in determining when a cause of
action arises,16O and doctors have acknowledged that a precise determination is impossible given the current medical science,161 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland seemingly suggests in Brannan
that defendants must establish "precisely when the plaintiffs developed their mesotheliomas."162 As plaintiff's experts have acknowledged, determining the exact date of harm is impossible. 163 Thus, it
is inconceivable that Maryland courts would require defendants to
overcome this insurmountable hurdle. The Brannan court's ruling
compounds the confusion surrounding the application of the
noneconomic damages cap in latent disease cases in Maryland.
V.

LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

The effect of a cap on noneconomic damages on loss of consortium claims is another issue currently being litigated in Maryland. l64 Maryland courts have held that a loss of consortium claim is
derivative of the injured spouse's personal injury claim, and, therefore, a single cap applies to the entire action. 165
In Grimshaw, the trial court refused to apply the noneconomic
damages cap to reduce the three plaintiffs' one million dollar loss
of consortium awards. l66 The court of special appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling, reasoning that the plaintiffs suffered personal injury when they developed mesothelioma. 167 Thus, the cause of action in each case arose prior to the effective date of the statute, not159. See id.
160. See Owen-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 122-23, 604 A.2d 47, 54-55
(1992).
161. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
162. See Brannan, slip op. at 42.
163. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
164. See generally supra notes 12, 105-06 and accompanying text.
165. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 38, 660 A.2d 423,430 (1995); Mary H. Keyes,
Survey, Loss of Consortium and the Cap on Noneconomic Damages, 55 Md. L. Rev.
819, 832 (1996) (concluding that the Connors court accurately carried out the
intent of the legislature by applying the noneconomic damages cap to the aggregate award).
166. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 166, 692 A.2d 5, 21
(1997).
167. See id.
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withstanding the fact that some of the harm suffered-loss of
consortium-occurred after that date. 168
Apparently, the Grimshaw court based its holding on the implicit notion that loss of consortium damages constitute merely a
part of the harm arising from the spouse's physical injuries; thus,
for purposes of applying the cap statute, the physical injury constituted the only injury that was applicable to determining when the
cause of action arose.1 69
The court did not, however, explicitly address the question of
whether, in determining the applicability of the cap statute, the injury to the marital unit and the spouse's personal injury are one injury or two separate injuries. Although a loss of consortium claim
derives from the initial injury to the spouse, it clearly represents an
injury separate from that suffered by the injured spouse. It is an injury to the marital unit. 170 To conclude that loss of consortium is
the same injury, in the sense that all the elements of a cause of action for loss of consortium are present when the elements of the
cause of action based on the personal injury claim are met, does
not reflect factual reality. The loss of consortium-the "loss of society, affection, assistance, and co~ugal fellowship"171-does not occur when the first cancer cell forms in the injured spouse's body,
even though that cancer may be the injury that results in the ultimate death. Generally, a plaintiff's loss of consortium would not occur until well after the spouse's first symptom, when the injury prevents the spouse from doing what he or she used to be able to do,

168. The Grimshaw court stated:
In the case at bar, each plaintiff exposed to asbestos suffered personal injury when he or she developed mesothelioma, which was
prior to 1986. It is true, however, that some of the harm plaintiffs
suffered as a result of those personal injuries, i.e., loss of consortium,
did not occur until after the effective date of the statute . . . . Although plaintiffs cont~nued to suffer damages, as a result of their
personal injuries, after the effective date of the statute ... the cause
of action arose prior to the effective date.
[d.; see also Porter Hayden Co. v. Brannan, No. 190, slip op. at 38 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App., Mar. 10, 1998) ("We ... explained in Grimshaw that, because a loss
of consortium claim is derivative of a claim for personal injury, the cause of
action for loss of consortium is deemed to have arisen when the cause of action for personal injury arose, even if the hann actually occurred later.").
169. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 166-67, 692 A.2d at 21.
170. See Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 115, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967).
171. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 33-34, 660 A.2d 423, 428 (1995).
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thus, adversely affecting the marital relationship.172 Analogous to a
loss of consortium claim is a cause of action for wrongful death,
which arises upon the death of the injured spouse, and not when
the first cancerous cell forms in the spouse's body.173 It would be
logical to conclude, therefore, that a cause of action for loss of consortium can only arise when the marital unit experiences some
injury.

172. See id.
173. See generally Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860 (1982). In OxtolJy,
the court interpreted the effective date clause of the Health Care Malpractice
Claims Act, which provided that the Act would apply only to medical injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 1976. See id. at 85, 447 A.2d at 862. The question
presented to the court was whether medical injury occurred when the malpractice occurred or when a resulting harm or damage occurred. The court
concluded that medical injuries referred to "legally cognizable wrongs or damage arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render health care."
[d. at 94, 447 A.2d at 866. The court considered whether all claims arising out
of the injury to the patient would be treated as a unit for purposes of the statute's applicability where the initial physical injury occurred before, but some
of the claims arose after, the effective date. See id. at 95, 447 A.2d at 866-67.
The court considered situations in which a physical injury occurring before
the effective date resulted in continued damage to the patient after the effective date. See id. at 96-97, 447 A.2d at 867-68. The court concluded that a medical injury would have been deemed to have occurred prior to the Act's effective date, even though all of the resulting damage to the patient had not been
suffered prior to that date. See id. at 97, 447 A.2d at 868. Moreover, the court
concluded that a wrongful death claim, which asserted a separate cause of action, should not be treated as a claim for a separate medical injury, but
should be brought under the umbrella of the medical injury which constituted
the physical harm which was the basis of the survival action. See id. at 95, 99,
447 A.2d at 866-67, 869. The court concluded that based on the statute's purpose to reduce costs of handling claims, and because the statute provided a
new procedure governing litigation of medical malpractice actions, whereby
claims arising out of injuries after the effective date would be subject to arbitration, and those before would not, the legislature intended that all claims
arising out of one injury be litigated together. See id. at 97-98, 447 A.2d at 868.
Accordingly, it held that where a medical injury occurred before the effective
date, wrongful death actions based on that patient's death were not subject to
the Act, regardless of when the death occurred. See id. at 99, 447 A.2d at 869.
By contrast, application of the noneconomic damages cap to a loss of consortium claim in a case in which the cap does not apply to the underlying claim
for injury does not create the procedural problems involved in OxtolJy. Moreover, it is clear that, for purposes of cap applicability, the cap will apply to the
wrongful death action although the injury occurred prior to the applicable
date of the statute. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 153, 692 A.2d at 14.
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The problem inherent in the Grimshaw court's holding becomes clear when one contemplates the following situation. A
worker is exposed to asbestos between 1955 and 1978. He marries in
1990. He experiences his first symptoms in 1994, becomes ill, and
dies the same year. Mter his death, his estate and his widow bring
survival and wrongful death actions against various asbestos manufacturers. The court finds that his injury developed before 1986, his
cause of action therefore arose before 1986, and accordingly, the
limitation on noneconomic damages is inapplicable. The court further concludes that, under Grimshaw, the widow's cause of action
for loss of consortium arose before 1986, even though the couple
did not marry until 1990, and he did not experience any symptoms
until 1994.
Applying the Grimshaw test to the hypothetical loss of consortium claim highlights the test's illogical premise and inherent unworkability. As noted above, applying the Grimshaw Court's analysis
of the cap statute in the context of a personal injury claim demonstrates that in many cases, a cause of action may arise years before a
single item of damages has been incurred.174 Likewise, in the context of a loss of consortium claim, under the Grimshaw interpretation, a cause of action may be deemed to have arisen years before
the first injury to the relationship.175 In some cases, the cause of action for loss of consortium could be deemed to have occurred even
before the marriage took place. 176

VI. CALIFORNIA - BVTFRAM v. OWENS-CORNING
California, the only other state that has addressed some of the
above issues in the context of a statute limiting noneconomic damages,177 has chosen a direction that avoids the problems discussed
174. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
176. But see Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y
1995) (finding that because tortious injury occurred upon plaintiff's inhalation
of asbestos fibers, which occurred prior to his marriage, the wife could not recover loss of consortium damages even though husband's mesothelioma developed sixteen years after the marriage). The Consorti court made no distinction
between the i~ury to the husband and the injury to the marital unit. In a
later case, the Court of Appeals of New York recognized that its bright line exposure rule was abrogated by statute, specifically N.Y C.P.L.R. 214-<: (McKinney
1986), which provided for a discovery rule in toxic tort cases. See Blanco v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y 1997).
177. See Buttram v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997).
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above. 178 The Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt a similar
interpretation if and when it does accept this issue for review. 179
In August, the Supreme Court of California decided Buttram v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,180 which addressed the issue of when a
cause of action accrues for purposes· of applying California's
noneconomic damages cap to damages from a latent disease, such
as asbestos-related pleural mesothelioma. The Buttram court held
that the cause of action accrues when either the disease was diagnosed or when the plaintiff otherwise discovered the illness or injuries, whichever occurs first. 181 In doing so, the California court rejected as unworkable a test similar to the Grimshaw test. 182
The Fair Responsibility Act,183 popularly known as Proposition
51,184 is California's statutory limitation on damages. 185 Proposition
178. See id.
179. See Shepardson, supra note 19, at 474-75 (comparing Maryland's approach in
Armstrong II with California's approach in Buttram). As one commentator concluded, the Buttram court's approach "strikes the proper balance between consideration of a party's settled expectation of the law, accrual of rights, and implementation of new legislation." [d. at 478.
180. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 7l.
18l. See id. at 83; see also Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d llO0
(Conn. 1989) (holding that the cause of action accrued, for purposes of applicability of product liability statute, when plaintiff suffered actionable harmwhen plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that he had been injured
and that defendant's conduct caused such i~ury); Shepardson, supra note 19,
at 460 (explaining that the proper accrual date was held to be "the date of
the plaintiff's diagnosis or diagnosibility").
182. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 82.
183. See CAuF. CIY. CODE, §§ 1431-143l.5. (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
184. See Shepardson, supra note 19, at 459.
185. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 75. The Act begins with the following statement of
Findings and Declaration of Purpose:
The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as the
'deep pocket rule,' has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice
that has threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other
public agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted
in higher prices for goods and services to the public and in higher
taxes to the taxpayers.
(b) ... Under joint and several liability, if [deep pocket defendants]
are found to share even a fraction of the fault, they are often held financially liable for all the damage. The People-taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the form of higher
taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums.
(c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire and other protections because of soaring costs of lawsuits
and insurance premiums.

350

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

51, which took effect June 4, 1986, modified significantly the common law rule of joint and several liability in situations involving
comparative fault. 186 Under Proposition 51, multiple tortfeasors continue to be jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs' economic damages. 187 However, after Proposition 51, multiple tortfeasors are now
liable only for the percentage of noneconomic damages that correlates to their own percentage of fault. 188
Proposition 51, codified in California's Fair Responsibility Act,
provides:
In any action for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative fault,
the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages
shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant
shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that
defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment

§ 1431.1 (a)-( c). The measure declares that its purpose is to "remedy these inequities" by holding defendants "liable in closer proportion to their degree of
fault," id. § 1431.1 (c), thus eliminating the "deep pocket rule" and the resulting injustice to certain defendants. See id. § 1431.1 (a); Buttram, 941 P.2d at 75.
186. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 75.
187. See id.
188. See id. As stated by the California court:
Proposition 51 was designed to rectify the situation [that existed]
under California's comparative fault tort law, whereby a defendant
who bears only a small share of fault for an injury can be left with
the obligation to pay all or a large share of the plaintiff's damages
[when other more] culpable tortfeasors are insolvent. The drafters of
Proposition 51 attempted to alleviate the perceived inequity arising
from this situation. 'While recognizing the potential inequity in a
rule which would require an injured plaintiff . . . to bear the full
brunt of the loss if one of a number of tortfeasors should prove insolvent, the drafters of the initiative at the same time concluded that
it was unfair ... to require a tortfeasor who might only be minimally
culpable to bear all of the plaintiff's damages. As a result, the drafters crafted a compromise solution: Proposition 51 retains the traditional joint and several liability doctrine with respect to a plaintiff's
economic damages, but adopts a rule of several liability for
noneconomic damages, providing that each defendant is liable for
only that portion of the plaintiff's noneconomic damages which is
commensurate with that defendant's degree of fault for the injury.
[d. at 75 (quoting Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 590-91 (Cal.
1988)).
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shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount. 189
Like Maryland's cap statute, Proposition 51 is prospective only
in its application. 190 The California Supreme Court previously held
that Proposition 51 does not apply to a cause of action that has "accrued" before its effective date of June 4, 1986. 191
In Buttram, the California Supreme Court was called upon to
determine when the plaintiff's cause of action for damages arising
from mesothelioma accrued for the purpose of determining whether
Proposition 51 was applicable to his case. 192 The court reviewed a
court of appeal's decision affirming a trial court ruling that Proposition 51 did not apply to the plaintiff's case because the plaintiff's
medical testimony had established that "undetected cancer cells in
probability had started forming by 1984, two years prior to the effective date of Proposition 51,"193 and thus the plaintiff's cause of action for injuries arising from pleural mesothelioma had accrued
before the effective date. 194 The court of appeal had reasoned that,
for purposes of Proposition 51, plaintiff's cause of action accrued
when "he suffered some sort of appreciable, meaning compensable,
harm or injury."195 Under the court of appeal's test, "subclinical
(i.e., undiscovered and unmanifested) cellular changes, such as development of the first cancer cell, constitute [d] the 'appreciable
harm' that triggers accrual of a cause of action for Proposition 51
purposes in the latent disease context."196
189. Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.2(a). The statute defines noneconomic damages as "subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1431.2(b) (2).
190. See Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 598.
191. See id. at 611.
192. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 73.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. /d. The court of appeal articulated the test as follows: "[F] or purposes of determining the applicability of Proposition 51, a cause of action accrues when
the injury reaches the point that it is 'compensable,' i.e., when the plaintiff
suffers such 'appreciable harm' that he would be entitled to commence an action for damages." Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d
703, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997). In applying the
test, the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered appreciable harm
prior to the effective date of Proposition 51 where there was unrebutted testimony that the plaintiff "probably had cancer cells seven years before the 1991
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The Supreme Court of California noted that there were a number of possible triggering events that might establish the accrual
date of a cause of action for personal injuries arising from a latent
disease. 197 The possible triggering events included medically significant events such as exposure to the substance, subclinical changes,
the appearance of symptoms, diagnosis, or legally significant events
such as actual or constructive knowledge of the development of the
disease. 198
The court observed, however, that a cause of action may be
viewed as accruing for different purposes on different dates; in the
context of third-party liability insurance coverage, courts have invoked an early accrual date; and in a statute of limitations analysis,
courts have applied a later accrual date, consistent with the policy
considerations underlying each determination. 199 The court observed that one consideration that it took into account in determining that Proposition 51 was only to be applied prospectively was that
applying it retroactively could have unfair consequences on parties
who had acted in reasonable reliance on pre-Proposition 51 law. 20o
However, in the context of determining the appropriate accrual

197.

198.
199.
200.

discovery of fluid in his lungs." [d. at 707; see also Peterson v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("We hold that,
for purposes of Proposition 51, an action accrues when the plaintiff undergoes
a physiological change that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
caused the condition giving rise to the claim."), overruled by Buttram v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997); Coughlin v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("[TJhe key inquiry is:
When did plaintiff suffer sufficient injury such that, had he been aware of it,
he could have established a cause of action?"), overruled by Buttram, 941 P.2d
71.
See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 76-77. Specifically, the court stated:
Analytically, one could posit a continuum of triggering events which,
from a medical or legal standpoint, might be used to establish the
date on which a cause of action for personal injuries arising from a
latent disease has "accrued," beginning with initial exposure to the
toxic substance and proceeding through the inception of undetected
physical changes (i.e., "subclinical" or "cellular" changes), the first
appearance of symptoms, medical diagnosis (which may come before
or after the onset of symptomatology), and the occurrence of certain
legally significant events (i.e., actual or constructive knowledge of the
onset of disease).
[d.
See id.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 79-80.
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date of a cause of action for latent disease, the reasonable reliance
consideration did not exist, because prior to discovery or diagnosis,
the plaintiff has no awareness of his injury or of the possibility of a
need to file suit in the future. 201
.The Supreme Court of California observed that the Court of
Appeals of Maryland's opinion in Armstrong II "gives no consideration whatsoever to the analogous policy considerations and purposes to be served in adopting an accrual rule that determines the
applicability of a tort reform statute such as Proposition 51. "202 The
Buttram court added: "We cannot agree that subclinical alteration of
the cells during the decades-long latency period of asbestos-related
disease, determined only in retrospect through medical testimony,
without manifestation of any symptoms or awareness of illness on
the plaintiff's part, should be the event establishing accrual .... "203
The California court noted that under the appreciable harm
test, an asbestos plaintiff who had suffered no impairment or damages as of the effective date of Proposition 51, but whose medical
experts later convinced a jury that he had developed cellular
changes decades earlier, could have his suit governed by tort law
that was abrogated more than a decade earlier. 204 The court there201. See id. at 80. The court stated:
Until the plaintiff's injury is first diagnosed or discovered by the
plaintiff, he has no awareness of his disease or injuries, or of the possibility of a future need to file suit, much less any expectation of recovery. If diagnosis, or the plaintiff's discovery of his latent injuries,
does not occur until after June 4, 1986, the effective date of Proposition 51, then neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has had anyoccasion to calculate potential liability under the former rule of unrestricted joint and several liability. . . . Moreover, until there has
been actual harm or injury and an awareness of same, there can be
no noneconomic damages to be pled .... In short, none of the considerations that militated against declaring Proposition 51 retroactive
... would be undermined by a rule that looks to diagnosis or discovery of actual injury as the date on which a cause of action should be
deemed to accrue for the limited purpose of determining whether
Proposition 51's tort reform measures can be fairly and prospectively
applied in a latent injury case.
Id.
202. Id. at 82.
203. Id.
204. The court observed:
Under the ["appreciable harm" test] the lawsuits of any presently
identified or future asbestos plaintiff, who, as of Proposition 51's effective date of June 4, 1986, had no actual physical impairment or
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fore rejected a test "dependent on medical testimony that seeks to
retrospectively determine the point at which asymptomatic undetected cellular changes in probability first altered the plaintiff's
physiology years or decades earlier,''205 and instead adopted the "diagnosis or discovery" test to determine applicability of the limitation
on noneconomic damages. 206
In rejecting the Court of Appeals of Maryland's reasoning in
Armstrong II, the Supreme Court of California noted that the Maryland court's holding in Armstrong II appeared to have been based, to
a large extent, on the express meaning of the word arises. 207 It observed that the California statute had no similar controlling
language. 208
.
Arguably, the use of the word arises, rather than accrnes, in Maryland's noneconomic damages cap statute supports the argument
that it would not be appropriate to make discovery or diagnosis the
trigger for determining the applicable date when determining
whether the claim is governed by the cap. However, that is not necessarily so. The Court of Appeals of Maryland defined arises as
"comes into existence''209 and concluded that a cause of action
arises when facts supporting all of its elements have come into exis-

205.
206.

207.
208.
209.

symptoms of any asbestos-related disease and who had yet to suffer
any noneconomic damages or harbor any awareness that he would in .
the future suffer from such a disease and ultimately bring suit against
asbestos defendants-but whose medical experts later convince a jury
in retrospect that in probability formation of asymptomatic and undetected cellular changes had commenced decades earlier-would be
governed by tort laws overwhelmingly abrogated by the electorate
over a decade ago. Indeed, given the decades-long latency periods of
asbestos-related disease, it is not unrealistic to conclude that under
the accrual test adopted by the Court of Appeal, the now disfavored
joint and several liability rule would still have to be applied in asbestos-related latent injury litigation well into the 21st century.
[d. at 83.
[d. at 80 n.5.
See id. at 80. However, the court did not consider the question of when a
cause of action for loss of consortium would accrue, nor did it specifically address the issue of which party bears the burden of proof with regard to accrual for purposes of applicability of the statute.
See id. at 81.
See id.
Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 121, 604 A.2d 47, 54 (1992); see
Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 155, 692 A.2d 5, 16
(1997) .
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tence. 210 The court of appeals stated that the fact of injury was generally the last to come into existence, and therefore, a cause of action arose when the injury came into existence. 211
The Armstrong II court then assumed that the injury would have
to occur before diagnosis or discovery.212 It would be equally consistent with the language of the statute, however, to conclude that the
injury occurred, and thus the cause of action arose, upon diagnosis
or discovery, whichever occurred earlier. This is consistent with the
requirement that the plaintiff incur some objectively verifiable functional impairment in order to have a legally compensable injury.213
It is only after the plaintiff has been diagnosed or has experienced
symptoms of disease that the plaintiff incurs such legally compensable damages as lost wages and pain and suffering.214 Thus, a diagnosis or discovery test would be consistent with the language of Maryland's noneconomic damages cap statute.
A diagnosis or discovery test would be both simpler to apply and
more consistent with the policy considerations underlying the statute. The Maryland courts' mechanical application of the language
of the statute gives no consideration either to the policy considerations or to the practical considerations associated with applying the
statute.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not yet expressed a willingness to address the issue of the applicability of the statutory cap
on noneconomic damages. 215 The court should grant certiorari on
this issue in a future case in order to clarifY the law, remedy the
problems of proof discussed above, and ensure that the statute is
applied in a manner which more fully effectuates its intent.
The court should clarifY its holding in Armstrong II, that a cause
of action arises for purposes of the cap statute "when facts exist to
support each element, "216 of the cause of action, with the fact of injury being the last element to come into existence, by defining the
injury element as requiring legally compensable harm that would
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Armstrong II, 326 Md. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54.
See id.
See id. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54.
See supra notes 91, 106, 108, 138, 150 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
See supra note 103.
Armstrong II, 326 Md. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54.
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form a basis for recovery by a plain tiff. 217 The court should reaffirm
the Armstrong I holding that mere alteration of the pleura-the thin
membrane which lines the chest wall and diaphragm-does not
constitute a legally compensable injury218 because it does not cause
any loss or detriment.219 Further, the court should make clear that
legally compensable injury occurs only when physical changes cause
an objectively verifiable functional impairment, as expressed by the
court of special appeals in Armstrong L220 Further, the court should
make clear that functional impairment does not occur until a plaintiff has experienced symptoms of the disease which actually impair
his physical functioning. 221 Finally, the court should make clear that,
for the purpose of applying the cap statute, an injury does not occur until the plaintiff suffers damages which are legally compensable, such as medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, or loss
of consortium. 222
The test adopted by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
in Grimshaw is based upon a "development of disease" analysis, for
which there seems to be no objective measure. This test seems inconsistent with settled principles of Maryland law requiring that, in
order to state a tort cause of action, a plaintiff must incur legally
compensable damages. 223
California's "discovery or diagnosis" test, adopted in Buttram,
avoids the problems associated with the Grimshaw test. California's
test provides a clear method for courts to determine when a cause
of action arises for purposes of applying the limits provided by
noneconomic damages cap statutes. 224 Maryland and other states
faced with these issues in asbestos or other latent disease cases can
avoid the problems described above by adopting similar tests.

217.
218.
219.
220.

221.
222.
223.
224.
text.

See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
See Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 735, 591 A.2d 544, 561
(1991) ("Mere exposure to asbestos and cellular changes resulting from asbestos exposure, such as pleural plaques and thickening, alone is not a functional
impairment or harm, and therefore, do not constitute a legally compensable
injury."); see also supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-77, 106-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160-63, 192-98, 202-14 and accompanying
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APPENDIX
Testimony of Medical Expert for Plaintiff in Sheppard v. ACandS,
Case No. 97121701, Circuit Court for Baltimore City:

Q. Doctor, with respect to the cancers caused by asbestos exposure, do you have an opinion within reasonable
medical certainty as to when those tumors began?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. With respect to mesothelioma, I think there is good
evidence in the medical literature to suggest that those cancers begin at least ten years before they are diagnosed clinically....
Q. Now, you said there is some good evidence in the
literature.
Does this have to do with the idea of doubling times?
A. It does.
[Extended explanation of various studies involving
doubling times-mathematical formulas for measuring the
rate of growth of certain cancers]
Q. Doctor, the concepts about doubling time and how
cancers grow that you have discussed with the jury here today, are those concepts that are generally accepted in the
medical literature? ...
A. Yes.
The following testimony was elicited on crossexamination.
Q. Now you told us that you had ... a pretty thick file
of articles that dealt with doubling, tumor doubling or tumor growth?
A. Yes.
Q. If I did pick up your file, there would only be one
article in that file that would deal specifically with the issue
of doubling or growth, tumor growth for mesotheliomas,
am I correct?
A. Only one that I know about. ...
Q. Fair enough. And the only one, as you said, that you
are aware of is the article by Dr. Greengard and others
styled, Enzyme Pathology of Human Mesotheliomas, published in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute in
1986, correct? . . .
Q. Now I don't think I heard this.
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Did you tell the jury that there are a lot of folks in the
medical and scientific community that have not found this
study to be reliable in terms of doubling time or growth
rate for mesotheliomas?
A. I think there has always been a question about the
thymidine kinase concept.
And the issue has always arisen as how accurate that is
with respect to whether or not it is as accurate as the doubling times calculated by mathematical measurements of
chance in the tumor over a period of time. . . .
And that's probably going to exist until more data is
given. But, you know, I think Greengard, at least in her initial article, indicated why she thought it was accurate. And
she indicated in the second article on mesotheliomas what
the values she obtained for the 16 cases that she examined.
Q. You yourself have expressed that opinion under
oath that this very article, the only article dealing with
doubling time for mesotheliomas, in fact, in your opinion is
not reliable?
A. Well, I - I don't know exactly how I said it. I would
say that when you only have one article that talks about a
subject like that, you can't absolutely be certain that that is
what is going to come out to be the absolute way the data
is.
But I would also say that that is the only thing that has
been done. And based on Greengard's initial studies, there
is reasons to believe that that data at least would indicate
what the doubling times were for lung cancers, based on
the data that she calculated.
What she didn't do, and there is no way to do this,
there is no way to do a mathematical calculation of doubling times in mesothelioma. It is impossible. And the reason
it is impossible is because of the way the tumor grows.
So then you are always going to have to take this data
that is attributable to some other type of tumor and see if
you can apply it to mesothelioma.
And I think I gave the reasons that I thought you
could, in general, apply lung cancer doubling to mesothelioma, based on the fact that the epithelial mesotheliomas
have a lower S phase, and have a more normal DNA index
than, say, pulmonary adenocarcinomas.
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Q. In the Walatka deposition, you talked about that
there was one study that had been done, but that you did
not think it was that reliable of a study.
"Is that the study that was done by, I guess, it was the
pediatrician, Greengard."
Your answer on March 4, 1997 was, "Yes."
"QUESTION: Are there any other studies other than
the Greengard study?"
And your answer was, "No." ...
Q. Now, . . . would it be fair to state, contrasted with
the issue of doubling time with lung cancer, very few people have considered the issue of doubling time with
mesothelioma?
A. That's true. That's for the reasons I have already expressed. Namely, that it is a tumor that can't be measured
by ordinary radiographic techniques.
Q. For that reason, you do not think there is any absolute experimental data, either clinical or experimental for
that matter, that will tell us exactly what the doubling time
is for mesothelioma?
A. Correct. I think I answered that, too.
Q. As of today, you have not done any [experimental
work] that you have published in the medical literature; is
that right?
A. Not published in the medical literature, no.
Q. And would you agree that, basically, your thought is,
we know very little about how fast mesotheliomas grow?
A. In general, that is correct.
Q. Now, at the close of your direct examination, Doctor, you were asked a question about when a specific - a
mesothelioma began in a specific individual.
Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, you have been asked that question before,
have you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me take you back to your deposition in the
Walatka matter, which was referenced in the earlier question and answer. . . .
Q. And if I could direct you to page 50, Doctor, you
were asked the following question.
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Quote, "QUESTION: SO, Doctor, if I were to put the
question to you, do you have an opinion to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty concerning how long before
June of 1995, Mr. Walatka had a malignant mesothelioma,
would you be able to answer that question?
"ANSWER: I wouldn't be able to answer in a scientific
manner, or a manner based on scientific fact. All I could
basically do would be to tell you what I just told you." . . .
"QUESTION: SO to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, you could not answer that question?
"ANSWER: That is probably correct. I really couldn't. I
don't think anybody can answer that question."
Did I read that correcdy?
A. You did.
Q. And you subsequendy testified at the trial of that
matter in Baltimore on February 3, 1997, did you not? ...
Q. And referring now to page 1179, "QUESTION: You
can't say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
how long before June of 1995, Mr. Walatka had a malignant
mesothelioma?
"ANSWER: Probably not within medical certainty.
There has only actually been one study that had looked at
how fast mesotheliomas grow and how - what their doubling time is. And that study might not even be reliable, so I
could not."
Q. And then you were asked a follow-up question on
page 1180, the next page, and you were asked this follow-up
question.
"Is it just not known at this point in time?
"ANSWER: It is the type of tumor that might not be
known for a long time until we get some better methods,
because it doesn't grow as a spherical mass. It grows as a
rind. And it is very hard to see the change in size over
time, which is necessary to calculate how fast a tumor
grows."
Did I state your answer to that question correcdy?
A. You did, yes.
Q. And as you have told us a moment ago, there isn't
anything new and starding in the medical literature which
has appeared since your deposition in December of 1996,
or your trial testimony in 1997 on the issue of doubling
time and mesotheliomas; is that correct?
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A. That is correct.

Official Trial Transcript at T.1610, T.1660-61, T.1749-60, Sheppard v.
ACandS, Inc., No. 97121701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (testimony of
Dr. Hammar).

